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“There is no treatment in psychiatry more frightening than electroconvulsive therapy
. . . .  There also is no treatment in psychiatry more effective.”1
While it is well settled in the state of New York that the scope of cross-
examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court,2 this power is not
absolute, and an abuse of discretion is grounds for reversal.3  The principle of
judicial notice is equally well settled.4  Although a court may take judicial notice
of general common knowledge, such as the laws of nature and the geographical
locations of countries, a court should not take judicial notice of matters specific to
its own knowledge.5  Occasions do arise, however, when a court may take judicial
notice of matters within its own knowledge.  Nevertheless, such action is only
considered proper if the court takes certain steps, such as obtaining the consent of
the parties and allowing possible discrepancies to be cured.6
In In re Simone D., the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the
Appellate Division, Second Department erred in finding that the trial court had
properly curtailed the cross-examination of a psychiatrist called by the petitioner,
Creedmoor Psychiatric Center (“Creedmoor”), during a proceeding for an order to
administer electroconvulsive therapy7 (“ECT”) to a patient without her consent.8
1. KITTY DUKAKIS & LARRY TYE, SHOCK: THE HEALING POWER OF ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY, at
vii (2006).
2. See People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 244 (1969); People v. Perez, 749 N.Y.S.2d 425 (2d Dep’t
2002); People v. Sul, 652 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (2d Dep’t 1996); Ingebretsen v. Manha, 631 N.Y.S.2d 72, 73
(2d Dep’t 1995); People v. McGriff, 607 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (2d Dep’t 1994); People v. Diaz, 570
N.Y.S.2d 149 (2d Dep’t 1991).
3. See  Friedel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 296 N.Y. 347, 352 (1947); People v. Mothon, 729
N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (2d Dep’t 2001). See generally 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 591 (2006); 98
C.J.S. Witnesses  §§ 448, 494 (2006).
4. “Judicial notice” is defined as a “court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a
party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 863–64 (8th ed. 2004).
5. See Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42 (1875) (“Of private and special facts, in trials in equity and at law,
the court or jury, as the case may be, is bound carefully to exclude the influence of all previous knowl-
edge.”); Weatherton v. Taylor, 187 S.W. 450, 452 (Ark. 1916) (“The personal knowledge of the chancellor
is not judicial knowledge of the court, for there is no way of testing the accuracy of the knowledge which
rests entirely within the breast of the court.”); 5 ROBERT A. BARKER & VINCENT C. ALEXANDER, NEW
YORK PRACTICE: EVIDENCE IN NEW YORK STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 2:3 (2006).
6. See infra pp. 315–17.
7. Electroconvulsive therapy is commonly referred to as ECT.
With electroconvulsive therapy, electrodes are placed on the head and an electric current is
applied to induce a seizure in the brain.  For reasons that aren’t understood, the seizure
alleviates depression.  Usually five to seven treatments, one treatment every other day, are
given.  Because the electric current can cause muscle contractions and pain, the person re-
ceives general anesthesia during treatments.  Electroconvulsive therapy may cause some
temporary (rarely permanent) loss of memory.
THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 407 (Robert Berkow et al. eds., Home ed. 1997).
Other side effects of ECT include disorientation and confusion.  See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHIA-
TRY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 130 (Benjamin B. Wolman ed., 1996); see also AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 71–72 (Narriman C. Shahrokh & Robert E. Hales eds., 8th ed. 2003); RICHARD
SLOANE, THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 724–25 (1987).  In the
United States, more than one hundred thousand patients currently receive ECT each year. DUKAKIS &
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the Second Department’s holding that curtailing
the cross-examination of the witness was within the sound discretion of the trial
court.9  In the wake of its decision, however, the Court of Appeals implicitly
reversed the well-established rule that a court should not rely on its own knowl-
edge during the adjudication of a case without taking the proper procedural steps
to establish that knowledge on the record.10  The decision of the Court of Appeals
essentially establishes that a court may, in fact, take judicial notice of its own
knowledge without confirming such knowledge on the record.11
Diagnosed with a severe depressive disorder, Simone D. was admitted to
Creedmoor in 1994 and began receiving ECT treatments the following year.12
Throughout the course of her treatment at Creedmoor, Simone D. was subjected
to approximately 148 ECT treatments without her consent pursuant to several
court orders.13  In November 2005, Creedmoor once again sought a court order to
administer ECT without Simone D.’s consent, claiming that without such treat-
ment she became unresponsive, aggressive, and refused to eat.14  At a hearing
before the Supreme Court, Queens County, the psychiatrist who administered the
treatment at Creedmoor, Dr. Ella Brodsky, testified.15  Dr. Brodsky explained
the physical and emotional ramifications of the patient’s disease, such as her re-
fusal to communicate or interact, and stated that ECT had previously worked to
cure such problems.16  Dr. Brodsky further opined that there were no other alter-
natives available to Simone D. because previous options, such as medication, had
failed.17
During the cross-examination of Dr. Brodsky, Simone D.’s attorney at-
tempted to elicit information regarding the possible painful side effects that ECT
TYE, supra note 1, at 9.  Furthermore, “more than two out of three ECT patients are women, a trend that
holds whether the treatment is given in Finland or England, New Zealand or . . . Neenah, Wisconsin.”
Id. at 14.
8. In re Simone D., 9 N.Y.3d 828, 829 (2007).
9. Id .
10. “A judge who has personal knowledge of some fact bearing on the case should promptly advise counsel of
this knowledge, and afford the parties the opportunity to clarify any factual inconsistencies or to move for
recusal.” PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 2-205 (Richard T. Farrell ed., 2002) (1998) (citing Sam
& Mary Hous. Corp. v. Jo/Sal Mkt. Corp., 474 N.Y.S.2d 786, 788 (2d Dep’t 1984), aff’d, 64 N.Y.2d
1107 (1985); In re Justin EE, 544 N.Y.S.2d 892 (3d Dep’t 1989)).
11. See infra pp. 315–17.
12. In re Simone D., 821 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (2d Dep’t 2006) (Crane, J., dissenting), aff’d, 9 N.Y.3d 828
(2007).
13. Id.
14. See id. at 250 (majority opinion).
15. Id. at 249.
16. See id. at 250.
17. Id. 
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may have previously had on the patient.18  Rather than allowing this line of
questioning to continue so that Simone D.’s attorney could establish the potential
harm caused to the patient through the use of ECT, the court intervened, claim-
ing that “it was familiar with the workings of ECT.”19  The court also sustained
Creedmoor’s objections to questions regarding the possible negative neurological
and biological effects that ECT could cause, such as seizures and hemorrhages, as
well as the “dosage and duration of ECT.”20
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued an order allowing
Creedmoor to administer ECT without Simone D.’s consent.21  Simone D. ap-
pealed.  Upon review of the record below, a majority of the appellate court af-
firmed that Creedmoor “established by clear and convincing evidence that the
appellant [Simone D.] lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision with re-
spect to the proposed treatment and that the proposed treatment was narrowly
tailored to give substantive effect to her liberty interest.”22  Although the dissent
argued that the lower court had unfairly truncated the cross-examination of Dr.
Brodsky to the detriment of Simone D., the majority found that the lower court
acted well within its discretion.23  The majority also rejected the dissent’s argu-
ment that the lower court improperly relied on its own knowledge when it inter-
rupted the cross-examination and claimed to know about the potential painful
side effects of ECT.24
18. See id. at 252 (Crane, J., dissenting).  Simone D. claimed that the ECT treatment caused her pain. Id.
There was also evidence that “Simone D. had experienced cognitive impairment from ECT, resulting in
its discontinuance in 1996.” Id.
19. See id.
20. Id.  Simone D.’s counsel also requested that the court appoint an independent psychiatric examiner, but
the court refused, explaining that it was a matter of discretion. Id . at 251 (majority opinion).
21. Id. at 249.
22. Id. at 250.
23. Id .  The majority also found that the length of the hearing transcript clearly showed that the cross-
examination was not curtailed. Id. at 251 (“Indeed, while the direct examination of Dr. Brodsky encom-
passed only 13 pages of the hearing transcript, the cross-examination covered 44 pages.”).  However,
courts have previously found that the length of a cross-examination does not determine its sufficiency.
Selly v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 321 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (2d Dep’t 1971) (“The court told the cross-examiner he
had five minutes more, saying, ‘You have had over an hour and a quarter.  That is enough.’  When the
five minutes were up the court terminated the cross-examination . . . .  [P]rematurely terminating cross-
examination . . . [was a] reversible error.”).
24. Simone D., 821 N.Y.S.2d at 251 (“[T]here is no indication in the record that the court based its decision
on its own knowledge.”).  The dissent argued that the lower court’s reliance on its personal knowledge was
an error because:  (1) a judge must obtain the parties’ consent to consider facts outside the record, (2) the
court became an unsworn witness whose knowledge could not be questioned, and (3) the knowledge was
not memorialized on the record. Id. at 252–53 (Crane, J., dissenting).  The crux of the dissent’s argument
was that because the trial court relied on its own knowledge of ECT, without establishing such knowledge
on the record, it cannot be determined if the necessary burden was met. Id. at 253 (“Put simply, there is
no way to determine whether the petitioner met its burden because much of the evidence was contained
only in the court’s mind.”).
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Following the appellate court’s decision, Simone D. appealed to the Court of
Appeals.  In a three-paragraph decision, the Court of Appeals found that “[w]hile
specific evidentiary rulings can be debated, the patient’s attorney was allowed to
and did make clear to the court all the claimed weaknesses in the psychiatrist’s
testimony.”25  Rather than specifically addressing the issue of judicial notice,
which was raised by the dissent, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court
did not “exclud[e] any evidence material to the only disputed issue: whether the
proposed treatment was narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to the pa-
tient’s liberty interest, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances.”26  By
accepting that the trial court’s decision to look to its own knowledge of ECT was
not an error, the Court of Appeals essentially held that New York State courts
may now take judicial notice of matters within their own knowledge without
establishing such knowledge on the record.
Judicial notice is a means by which a court may circumvent the process of
establishing formal evidentiary proof.27  When a court seeks to take judicial notice
of an adjudicative fact, the fact in question must be one of either general knowl-
edge or a fact “which can be ascertained by reference to readily available sources
whose accuracy is not subject to reasonable dispute.”28  Personal knowledge alone
25. Simone D., 9 N.Y.3d at 829.
26. Id. The law that controls matters dealing with the administration of treatment to a patient without his
or her consent is found in the seminal New York Court of Appeals case Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485
(1986). Rivers held that  “[i]n our system of a free government, where notions of individual autonomy
and free choice are cherished, it is the individual who must have the final say in respect to decisions
regarding his medical treatment . . . to insure that the greatest possible protection is accorded his autonomy
and freedom.”  67 N.Y.2d at 493.  The petitioner for the administration of treatment without a patient’s
consent must show by clear and convincing evidence that the patient is incapable of making a decision
regarding her treatment. Id. at 497; see also In re Michael L., 809 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (2d Dep’t 2006)
(discussing the higher standard of proof).  Furthermore, the treatment sought must be “narrowly tailored
to give substantive effect to the patient’s liberty interest.” Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 497.  In order to deter-
mine whether the treatment is appropriate, the court must take “into consideration all relevant circum-
stances, including the patient’s best interests, the benefits to be gained from the treatment, the adverse side
effects associated with the treatment and any less intrusive alternative treatments.” Id. at 497–98; see
also  Steven Mintz, Note, The Nightmare of Forcible Medication: The New York Court of Appeals
Protects the Rights of the Mentally Ill Under the State Constitution, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 885,
909–11 (discussing the balancing of factors that a court must perform under Rivers).  Although Rivers
dealt with the administration of antipsychotic drugs, it has also been determined that ECT is an intrusive
procedure; thus, Rivers applies. See, e.g., In re Adam S., 729 N.Y.S.2d 734 (2d Dep’t 2001); In re Rosa
M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1991). Rivers has also been found to apply to cases where a
child services agency seeks to administer psychiatric medicine to a foster child without the parent’s consent.
See, e.g., In re Martin F., 820 N.Y.S.2d 759 (Fam. Ct. Monroe County 2006).
27. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 24 (2006).
28. 5 BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 5, § 2:3; see also People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 427, 431 (1989);
Carter v. Metro North Assocs., 680 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (1st Dep’t 1998) (“[A] court may only apply
judicial notice to matters of common and general knowledge, well established and authoritatively settled,
not doubtful or uncertain.  The test is whether sufficient notoriety attaches to the fact to make it proper to
assume its existence without proof.”) (quoting Dollas v. W.R. Grace & Co., 639 N.Y.S.2d 323, 323 (1st
Dep’t 1996)).  Procedurally, judicial notice may be taken upon the urging of one of the parties or may be
taken sua sponte. PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE, supra note 10, § 2-202 (“[F]airness should
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will rarely fall into either one of these two categories because the required stan-
dard is objective, not subjective.29  Furthermore, judicial notice of adjudicative
facts based on a court’s own knowledge is often found to be improper.30
Prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals in In re Simone D., New York
appellate courts consistently found that if a court erroneously takes judicial notice
it is grounds for reversal.31  For example, the First Department found that a
court may not restrict cross-examination by taking judicial notice if doing so
would deny the objecting party an opportunity to fully litigate the issues.32  In
People v. King, the prosecution failed to notify the defense that the alleged rape
victim had filed an application to receive financial assistance from the Crime
Victims Compensation Board.33  After this fact came to light, the trial judge re-
fused to allow the defendant’s attorney the opportunity to re-call the victim for
further cross-examination about whether she had filed the application for remu-
neration.  Instead, the trial judge took “judicial notice” of this fact, even though
the victim’s credibility was at issue.34  Upon review, the First Department rea-
require, however, that in either event, the Judge afford the parties the opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety of taking judicial notice in the particular instance.”).  While judicial notice of the law is governed
by New York statutory law, judicial notice of facts has expanded through the common law system, which
could account for some of the inconsistencies. Id. § 2-101.
29. 5 BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 5, § 2:3.  Examples of the types of adjudicative facts of which the
courts have taken judicial notice include: “public records, the court’s own records, public officials, census
data, geographical facts, historical facts, current events, days and dates, human characteristics, animal
characteristics, matters of commerce and trade, scientific and mechanical facts.” Id. § 2:4; see, e.g., Kha-
tibi v. Weill, 778 N.Y.S.2d 511 (2d Dep’t 2004) (holding it proper to take judicial notice of undisputed
court records); see also Grant v. Zachman, 825 N.Y.S.2d 621 (4th Dep’t 2006) (holding it proper to
refuse to take judicial notice of the nonparty status of a person in a lawsuit because it was not common
knowledge).  Recently, a New York court took judicial notice of the effects of the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks on certain New York City communities.  Fabcon East, L.L.C. v. Steiner Bldg. Co. NYC,
No. 24639/02, slip op. at 13–14 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Dec. 12, 2005).
30. See, e.g., Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Eisner, 276 N.Y. 121 (1937) (holding that it was im-
proper for the court to rely on its personal knowledge arising from an independent investigation of the
property in question); Blonder & Co. v. Citibank, N.A., 808 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1st Dep’t 2006) (holding that
it was an improper exercise to take judicial notice of the court’s own beliefs of international banking
practices); Dollas, 639 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1st Dep’t 1996) (holding that it was an error to take judicial notice
of personal knowledge that asbestos products were never used at the area in question in light of contradic-
tory evidence); People v. Dow, 162 N.Y.S.2d 960 (4th Dep’t 1957) (holding it improper for the judge to
take judicial notice that he knew how the arraignment system functioned during a certain period of time
when adjudicating a coram nobis proceeding); Gibson v. Von Glahn Hotel Co., 185 N.Y.S. 154 (1st
Dep’t 1920) (holding that it was improper to take judicial notice of the court’s personal knowledge that the
defendant’s establishment was a hotel).
31. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Mazula, 832 N.Y.S.2d 685
(3d Dep’t 2007); NYC Medical & Neurodiagnostic, P.C. v. Republic Western Ins. Co., 798 N.Y.S.2d 309
(2d Dep’t 2004).
32. People v. King, 659 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (1st Dep’t 1997) (“The court in taking ‘judicial notice’ and fore-
closing cross-examination . . . deprived defense counsel of an opportunity to challenge that [victim’s]
credibility.”).
33. Id . at 469–70.
34. Id. at 470.
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soned that by foreclosing cross-examination and taking judicial notice, the trial
court had deprived the defense of an opportunity to challenge the victim’s credi-
bility with regard to whether she had filed the application.35  Therefore, it was
improper for the trial judge to prohibit the defendant from cross-examining the
victim.36
Erroneously curtailing cross-examination is only one example of improper
judicial notice.37  The Court of Appeals has held that “[i]t is elementary that a
judge should not decide an issue upon personal knowledge of facts outside the
record.”38  In Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Eisner, an action to
foreclose a mortgage, the trial judge was dissatisfied with the referee’s proposed
value of the property in question, and embarked upon his own personal investi-
gation of the property to determine its value.39  In effect, when establishing the
value of the property during the adjudication of the case, the trial judge took
judicial notice of his own knowledge.40  The Court of Appeals found the judge’s
decision improper because it denied the parties the opportunity to challenge the
evidence through cross-examination or to introduce evidence to the contrary.41
For seventy years, the principle established in Central Hanover—that a
court should not take judicial notice of facts outside of the record, such as its own
knowledge—was good law.  For example, in NYC Medical & Neurodiagnos-
tic, P.C. v. Republic Western Insurance Co., the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.42  In denying the defendant’s motion, the
trial court conducted its own Internet investigation into the plaintiff company’s
background and business in order to establish the necessary jurisdictional contacts
with New York.43  The appellate court reversed and held that by relying on its
own investigation, the trial court improperly took judicial notice because it “went
outside the record in order to arrive at its conclusions, and deprived the parties
an opportunity to respond to its factual findings.”44
While the case law prior to In re Simone D. clearly established that a court
should refrain from taking judicial notice of matters within its own knowledge,45
there were still occasions when a court’s decision to take such notice was upheld,
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See infra pp. 316–17.
38. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Eisner, 276 N.Y. 121, 125 (1937).
39. See id. 
40. See id.
41. Id .
42. 798 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (2d Dep’t 2004).
43. Id. at 313.
44. Id. (“[T]here was no showing that the Web sites consulted were of undisputed reliability, and the parties
had no opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice in the particular instance.”).
45. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
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but only if the appropriate steps were taken.46  In Sam & Mary Hous. Corp. v.
Jo/Sal Mkt. Corp., the trial judge took judicial notice of her personal knowledge
that could potentially harm the credibility of the plaintiff’s witness.47  According
to the Second Department, it was not an error for the trial judge to take judicial
notice of her personal knowledge, because she informed the parties of the knowl-
edge and gave the plaintiff an opportunity to cure the potential discrepancies.48
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Second Department’s holding
that it was not improper for the trial judge to take judicial notice of her own
knowledge because such knowledge was confirmed on the record.49
In In re Simone D., the Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s deci-
sion to take improper judicial notice of its own knowledge of ECT was a
“debat[able]”50 evidentiary ruling and that “when . . . viewed as a whole, the
record show[ed] no abuse of discretion.”51  This decision significantly weakens the
prior case law on judicial notice, which had established that a court should not
take judicial notice of matters within its own knowledge.  In the wake of this
decision, courts will be able to circumvent the formalities of taking proper judicial
notice of matters within their own knowledge.  Rather than confirming their
knowledge on the record, judges can instead simply rely on their wide latitude of
46. Compare Sam & Mary Hous. Corp. v. Jo/Sal Mkt. Corp., 474 N.Y.S.2d 786 (2d Dep’t 1984), aff’d, 64
N.Y.2d 1107 (1985) (holding that it was appropriate for the trial judge to take judicial notice of personal
knowledge because she informed the attorneys and gave the potentially harmed party an opportunity to
address any inconsistencies of the judicially noticed fact), with Delorenzo v. Tyrell Paving Co., No. 2005-
1108 (2d Dep’t 2006) (holding that it was an error by the court to rely on outside facts without the parties’
consent), Hillside Place, LLC v. Pervin, No. 2002-851 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 2003) (holding that it was
improper to take judicial notice of knowledge of other cases without the parties’ consent), and Silberman v.
Antar, 654 N.Y.S.2d 319 (2d Dep’t 1997) (holding that it was an error by the court to rely on personal
knowledge without the parties’ consent). See Sangirardi v. State, 613 N.Y.S.2d 224 (2d Dep’t 1994)
(holding that it was proper for the judge to take judicial notice of his own personal knowledge regarding
fiscal crises that were part of an earlier case cited by the claimants in their brief); In re Justin EE, 544
N.Y.S.2d 892 (3d Dep’t 1989) (holding that while it was inappropriate to take judicial notice of the
respondents’ previous criminal histories without providing them an opportunity to dispute the veracity, it
was a harmless error); see also 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 50 (2d ed. 2006) (“The personal experience or private knowledge of the judge is not a proper
foundation for judicial notice, although trial judges occasionally overlook this well-established rule.”); 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 329 (6th ed. 2006) (“It is not a distinction easy for a judge to follow in
application, but the doctrine is accepted that actual private knowledge by the judge is no sufficient ground
for taking judicial notice of a fact as a basis for a finding or a final judgment, though it may still be a
ground, it is believed, for exercising certain discretionary powers, such as granting a motion for new trial
to avoid an injustice, or in sentencing.”).
47. 474 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
48. Id.
49. Sam & Mary Hous. Corp., 64 N.Y.2d at 1108 (“Order affirmed . . . for the reasons stated in the
memorandum of the Appellate Division.”).
50. 9 N.Y.3d at 829.
51. Id.
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discretion.52  In effect, the Court of Appeals has abolished the requirements that a
court confirm its knowledge on the record and allow the litigants the opportunity
to challenge that knowledge when the court takes judicial notice of matters
within its own knowledge.
The potential consequences of this decision are pervasive.  Cases may be de-
cided on incomplete records, and parties may be deprived of the opportunity to
fully litigate their cases.53  The issue of judicial notice arises in countless cases, on
matters as diverse as child custody, personal injury, sex offender registration, and
property valuation.54  Since the issue of judicial notice is not confined to a single
litigant or case, the negative effects of this decision will be widespread.
52. See id.
53. See  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2002 (McKinney 2007); see, e.g., People v. Dennis, 697 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1st Dep’t
1999) (holding that the court’s failure to record voir dire proceedings and, therefore, maintain a complete
record was  reversible error); People v. Smith, 670 N.Y.S.2d 46 (2d Dep’t 1998) (holding that a missing
record and insufficient reconstruction hearing mandated a reversal); People v. Fleming, 634 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1st Dep’t 1995) (holding that the absence of a stenographic record coupled with the inability of a recon-
struction hearing to cure the incomplete record was reversible error).
54. See generally Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Mazula, 832 N.Y.S.2d 685 (3d Dep’t 2007) (title insurance case);
People v. Woods, 815 N.Y.S.2d 843 (4th Dep’t 2006) (appeal from a determination that the defendant
was a certain risk level according to the Sex Offender Registration Act); Malpezzi v. Ryan, 815 N.Y.S.2d
295 (3d Dep’t 2006) (personal injury case arising from a pit bull attack); In re Anjoulic J., 794 N.Y.S.2d
709 (3d Dep’t 2005) (custody dispute involving a child’s grandmother).
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